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Studies & Analyses CASE No. 218 – Ma³gorzata JakubiakAbstract
This paper focuses on the measurement of a contemporaneous currency crisis. The
analysis covers 14 "emerging" or "transforming" economies that experienced episodes of
currency crises over the last decade. It adds to well-known examples relatively little-
known  evidence  on  the  crisis  depth  in  some  of  the  CIS  countries.  Following  the
Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1994) definition of a currency crisis, the emphasis is
primarily put on the examination of changes in relative reserves, exchange rates, and real
interest rates during periods of exchange rate pressure. Other measures of the depth of
a currency crisis as well as measures of external vulnerability are also discussed. The
findings support the adequacy of the Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1994) definition in
analyzing crisis developments in emerging economies.
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The aim of this paper is to provide a comprehensive definition of a contemporaneous
currency crisis and to illustrate this definition by examples of currency crises of the 1990s.
The discussion follows a text on theoretical aspects of currency crises [Antczak, 2000],
where the occurrence of such crisis is described [after Eichengreen et al., 1994] as 
a change in either a country's exchange rate, its level of foreign reserves, or its interest
rates. Thus, in the following parts, there is an illustration of what was happening with
these – and some other – macroeconomic variables during the times of most recent
currency crises.
In order to give some background, the research starts from description of pre-crisis
developments that show external vulnerability of countries in question. The analysis is
restricted to so called "emerging" or "transforming" economies. And adds to the well-
known examples relatively little known evidence on the crisis depth in some of the CIS
countries. The paper concludes with the assessment of the adequacy of proposed
definition in the measurement of recent crises.
2. Definition and Types of Financial Crises
Financial  crises  are  usually  grouped  into  the  three  broad  categories:  currency
crises, banking crises, and foreign debt crises [Aziz et. al, 2000]. A currency crisis
occurs when a speculative attack on a currency results in a sharp devaluation (or
depreciation) of the exchange rate, or when authorities try to defend the currency
using its foreign reserves or sharply raising interest rates [Eichengreen et. al, 1994]. 
A banking crisis usually demonstrates itself in bank runs or failures which "induce
banks to suspend the internal convertibility of their liabilities or which compel the
government to intervene to prevent this by extending assistance on a large scale" [Aziz
et. al, 2000: 5]. The causes of banking crisis frequently lie in a prolonged deterioration
of banks' assets quality. When a country cannot service its foreign debt, we speak
about the debt crisis. 
However, there are many cases, where elements of all or of any two of the described
types of financial crises may take place simultaneously. Moreover, one type of crisis may
develop itself into another. This is to say that often the symptoms of a currency crisis may
be also linked with other financial problems in the economy, and it is sometimes hard to
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banking, currency, and debt crisis (East Asia, Mexico), as well as banking crisis preceding
currency crisis (Bulgaria) in the countries included in the sample.
This  paper  concentrates  on  the  measures  of  a  currency  crisis.  Following
Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1994), the attention is primarily put on the examination
of changes in relative reserves, exchange rates, and real interest rates during periods of
exchange rate pressures. Because one of the aims of this study is to describe the currency
crises, some other symptoms of the loss of confidence in domestic money are also
included.  These  are:  shrinking  money  demand  and  sudden  real  exchange  rate
depreciation. 
Since the measurement and dating of currency crises pose some difficulties, episodes
of significant currency pressures were identified ex ante, based on existing information in
the  economic  literature  on  the  subject.  Only  then  statistical  tools  were  applied  to
describe their characteristics.
The analysis covers 14 emerging economies that experienced episodes of currency
crises over the last decade. These are: Argentina (1995 crisis), Brazil (1999), Bulgaria
(1997), the Czech Republic (1997), Georgia (1998), Indonesia (1997), Korea (1997), the
Kyrgyz  Republic  (1998),  Malaysia  (1997),  Mexico  (1994),  Moldova  (1998),  Russian
Federation (1998), Thailand (1997), and Ukraine (1998) [1]. Due to the lack of data on
individual time series, some of these countries had to be excluded from discussion on
particular indicators.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: reserve-based indicators of external
vulnerability plus real exchange rate developments are discussed first, followed by the fall
in reserves and nominal depreciation at a crisis date, then by the sudden fall in demand
for money, and interest rates differentials. Assessment of the adequacy of proposed
definition of the measurement of recent currency crises is given in conclusions.
3. Indicators of External Vulnerability to a Financial Crisis
Warning  signals  of  financial  distress  had  been  present  in  the  majority  of  sample
economies months before the currency crisis hit. This part shows how financially fragile
these economies have been by comparing pre-crisis reserve-based indicators of external
vulnerability and real exchange rate developments. 
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[1]   More precise timing of each crisis is given in Table 2.3.1. Reserves in Months of Imports
The  traditionally  used  measure  in  assessing  the  reserve  adequacy  is  external
reserves in months of imports of goods and services. It is a useful indicator of reserve
needs for countries with limited access to capital markets. However, since there is no
reference  to  capital  account,  it  is  claimed  that  there  is  a  weak  relation  between
reserves  over  imports  and  the  occurrence  or  depth  of  crises  in  the  more  recent
periods of financial turmoil [IMF, 2000].
It is commonly agreed that three months is the minimum period during which 
a country can continue to support its current level of imports if all other inflows and
outflows cease. As it can be seen from Table 1, this condition has never been met by
Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Mexico. On the contrary, East
Asian countries and Brazil recorded relatively safe reserves to imports ratio in 1997
and in 1998. Foreign reserves held by Argentina in 1995 fell when compared to
previous years, but were still sufficient to support, on average, more than 4 months
of imports.
The low ratio of reserves in terms of imports does not seem to describe well crisis
economies included in the sample, therefore there is a need to examine other measures
of reserve adequacy.
3.2. Reserves over Short-term External Debt
Measure that compares net reserves to short-term external debt captures well risks
associated with adverse developments in international capital markets. It shows how
quickly a country would be forced to adjust if it were cut off from external borrowing
[IMF, 2000]. It is claimed that this is the most important indicator of reserve adequacy in
countries with significant but uncertain access to capital markets. A smaller ratio suggests
greater incidence and depth of crisis [IMF , 2000].
IMF suggests that reserves should at least exceed official and officially guaranteed
short-term debt [IMF, 2000: 15]. The most recommended period for judging the reserves
to short-term debt ratio is the month prior to the crisis date, that is before a crisis took
full effect and impacted reserve levels.
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Table 1. Reserves in Months of Imports
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Argentina 4.289 4.917 6.181 4.280 4.722 5.989 7.044
Brazil 5.701 5.884 6.976 6.905 8.219 8.612 8.813
Bulgaria 1.796 3.175 1.488 3.421 6.085
Czech Republic 1.247 2.013 3.531 4.663 3.778 3.943
Georgia 2.280 1.869 1.812
Indonesia 3.311 2.966 2.438 2.563 3.071 5.569 5.453
Korea 1.935 1.979 1.711 2.019 2.418 3.131 4.182
Kyrgyz Republic 1.165 0.413 0.873 1.365 1.473 2.029
Malaysia 3.375 3.411 4.351 3.304 3.273 4.355 3.720
Mexico 2.926 2.989 2.775 1.437 1.707 2.139 2.642
Russian Fed. 1.083 0.761 1.223 1.649 2.806 1.823
Thailand 4.461 4.421 4.053 4.782 6.774 7.989 6.856
Ukraine 0.657 0.180 0.101 0.708 0.635 1.867 1.304
Source: Own calculations on the basis of data from IFS, Bulgarian National Bank, Georgian Economic Trends No. 1/2000, and Ukrainian Statistical Bulletin.
Notes: Average level of total reserves minus gold and imports over the next 12 months is used. Actual data on imports are included only in the ratios for
1998.   If we were to characterize the pre-crisis vulnerability by the reserves to short-term
debt ratio, Mexico, Korea, Indonesia, Russia, Bulgaria, and Thailand would be among
most severely affected, with international reserves well below their short-term debt
obligations. Argentina also recorded a very low level of reserves to short-term external
debt ratio, but no earlier than at the crisis date. Although the ratio declines for Malaysia
and Brazil the closer we move to the crisis date, with its value above 1.5 it still does not
indicate any danger of a currency crisis. High values for Ukraine (above 4) and – probably
– Moldova reflect improper classification of reserves.
3.3. Reserves to Reserve Money
The vulnerability of an economy to a financial turbulence can be also captured by the
developments in the ratio of reserves to a measure of money. The problem, however,
appears when deciding which monetary aggregate should be used. Traditionally, it is the
ratio of reserves to broad money. Yet, this poses difficulties, as it is hard to interpret when
the demand for money is generally low. Another puzzle is connected with the inclusion
10
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Source: Own calculations on the basis of IFS, Global Development Finance, and World Development
Indicators databases.
Notes: The stock of reserves is taken from the months prior to the crisis dates, and at the crisis dates.
Crisis dates are listed in Table1. Short-term external debt is the end-year value reported in GDF.of hard currency deposits in the broad money aggregates. It is then hard to differencible
between  a  change  in  the  demand  for  domestic  currency  and  a  demand  for  foreign
currency.
The analysis of evolution of hard currency deposits held in commercial banks during
the crises (see the Appendix) shows the validity of this last doubt. The section on money
demand further confirms the inappropriateness of looking at the broad money aggregates
in the case of low-monetization countries of our sample. 
Therefore, in assessing the financial fragility of an economy, author concentrates here
on the ratio of gross reserves to reserve money (the latter otherwise known as monetary
base). This measure has obvious advantages, that makes its use the most suitable here.
First of all, it shows well by how much the reserve money are backed by the official
reserves. And since, among all the monetary aggregates, it is the reserve money, which is
the most affected by changes in the exchange rate, it seems appropriate to examine it
here. Again, as with all the reserve-based indicators, its importance is especially high
when  judging  the  reserve  adequacy  under  fixed  exchange  regimes,  which  credibility
needs  to  be  established  [IMF,  2000:1].  The  rationale  behind  this  measure  is  that  an
unstable demand for high-powered money suggests greater probability of a capital flight.
Problems with the liquidity within the monetary system characterize well pre-crisis
months in Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, and
to some extent in Mexico (see Chart 2 and 3). East Asian economies recorded relatively
safe values of this measure in the months prior to the Asian crisis, but nevertheless –
substantially lower during the last months preceding the crisis – than at other times. 
A ratio of reserves to reserve money falling below one indicates potential difficulties with
the commitment to a nominal anchor in all of these countries. This indicator does not
have any importance when referring to the case of Malaysia which kept floating exchange
rate regime around the crisis time. 
As it has already been noted, relative importance of indicators based on monetary
aggregates for the countries in our sample is discussed in the sections that follow. These
analyses show that the meaning of monetary measures is especially weak in Ukraine. Low
monetization coupled with a very little change in hard currency deposits during the 1998
crisis show overall low confidence in the domestic currency and in the banking system.
3.4. Real Exchange Rate Developments
Real appreciation of a currency may reflect a loss of international competitiveness,
and  increasing  expectations  of  an  exchange  rate  adjustment  as  the  appreciation  is
11
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Source: Own calculations based on IFS IMF.
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expected to worsen the current account. If the real exchange rate appreciation leads to
a misaligned currency value, the current account deficit may be less sustainable in such
situation.  Then  the  large  current  account  deficit  coupled  with  the  perception  that 
a currency is overvalued may lead to a balance of payments type of crisis. However, not
every  real  appreciation  creates  current  account  sustainability  problems  (Balassa-
Samuelson effect, return to its long-run value after an initial overshooting).
We  can  see  from  Figure  4,  that  real  effective  exchange  rates  have  been  indeed
appreciating  through  several  months  prior  to  the  crises  in  Russia,  Malaysia,  the  Czech
Republic, and to some extent in Moldova. The same has been true for Bulgaria but when we
consider the 1996 banking crisis, which preceded currency crash. The real effective exchange
rate has not been appreciating in Ukraine during at least six months prior to the crisis.
Data from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF were used to describe the
evolution of real effective exchange rates. These data are available only for some of the
countries in the sample. Therefore, CPI based real exchange rates versus the US dollar
are used to show these developments in other economies (see Figure 5). The results of
real  appreciation  is  not  very  much  visible,  partly  because  some  of  the  countries
maintained peg to the dollar.


















Source: IFS IMF.Beginning of a currency crisis is marked by the large real exchange rate depreciation
in every economy. Next part of the paper describes changes that took place precisely at
the crisis time.
4. Loss of Reserves and Nominal Depreciation
International reserves held by monetary authorities are available for financing external
payments imbalances, thus helping to maintain liquidity, allow to absorb shocks, and
provide confidence in the authorities commitment to support the value of domestic
currency.  Since  it  is  very  costly  for  a  country  to  run  short  of  liquidity,  maintaining
a sufficient level of external assets is important in preventing currency crises.
When there is a sudden change in the direction of capital flows and capital starts
flowing out of a country, this outflow can be accommodated through a reserve decline,
without any change in the central bank interest or exchange rates. However, if monetary
authorities decide to devalue the currency or alter the level of interest rates, most of such
a shock can be absorbed through these changes [Berg, 1999].
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Source: Own calculations based on IFS IMF.Table  2  provides  data  on  reserve  losses  in  14  economies  that  suffered  from
a currency crisis in the 1990s. There were four economies – Malaysia, Indonesia, Bulgaria,
and Kyrgyz Republic – whose reserve assets fell by less than 20% at the time of a crisis.
Malaysia and Bulgaria were the only countries in the sample that kept floating exchange
rate regimes when financial crisis occurred, and lost "only" less than 20% of its external
reserves.  However,  Malaysian  reserves  deteriorated  again  during  the  next  year  and
started to rebuild at the end of 1998. Bulgaria experienced a banking crisis in 1996, during
which  the  central  bank  has  already  severely  depleted  its  exchange  reserves.  The
monetary authorities of Indonesia decided to float the rupiah in August 1997, following
intensified pressure on the currency since the Thai baht was floated in July. The external
reserves fell then only by $1.1 billion (5.2% from June 1997), but they continued to fall,
and the lowest level was recorded in February 1998. By then, international reserves of
Indonesia fell by 24% (4.8 $ billion) when compared to the pre-crisis period.
At the other end of the spectrum, there are countries affected by the Tequila crisis of
1994–1995, Russia, Ukraine, who lost over 40% of their external reserves in 1998, and
also Brazil. Russian central bank lost over 40% of its external reserves in just one month
15
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Table 2. The Severity of the Currency Crises Measured by Reserve Losses
Loss of reserves Country Crisis date
Reserves/M2





USD at a crisis date
Mexico Dec 1994 8.2% 64.5% 54.6%
Argentina Mar 1995 18.3% 41% 0%
Bulgaria Feb 1997 25.8% 16.8% 100.98%
Czech Republic May 1997 29.6% 23.0% 5.44%
Thailand Jul 1997 23.3% 23% 24.34%
Malaysia Jul 1997 23.2% 18.4% 4.19%
Indonesia Aug 1997 18.3% 5.2% 16.78%
Korea Dec 1997 17.0% 33.2% 45.64%
Russian Fed. Aug 1998 14.9% 40.6% 26.72%
Ukraine Sep 1998 25.2% 58.1% 51.11%
Moldova Nov 1998 111.2% 35% 55.41%
Kyrgyz Republic Nov 1998 87.96% 18.71% 19.40%
Georgia Dec 1998 59.9% 24.5% 16.8%
Brazil Jan 1999 24.2% 53.5% 64.08%
Source: Own calculations based of IFS data.
[2] Monetary authorities' reserve loss is calculated from the month the stock of these reserves peaks until
the crisis date [after Choueiri and Kaminsky, 1999].16
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trying to defend the exchange rate band. At the end of 1998, foreign reserves of the
central bank of Moldova fell to the 1994 levels.
5. Fall in Demand for Money
Demand for money is analyzed here for two reasons. First of all, a sudden fall in the
demand  for  a  currency  indicates  the  substitution  of  domestic  money  by  the  foreign
exchange and thus, a loss of confidence in this currency which may lead even to a crisis.
The second reason is to give a picture of how strongly demanded are local currencies in
the  sample  economies.  This  analysis  supports  the  earlier  discussion  on  the  relative
importance of measures based on monetary aggregates.
The  contraction  of  money  demand  is  approximated  here  by  indicators  of
monetization. Monetization of an economy is defined as a ratio of a measure of money to
an annualized value of GDP in current prices [after Jarociñski, 1998]. A decrease in
monetization means that holding money becomes more costly.
There are also other factors that may influence the monetization in our sample. One
example being inflation, which may have an additional negative impact.
Table 3. Broad Money Monetization in the Crisis Countries, 1992–1998
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Argentina 11.2% 16.3% 19.4% 18.8% 21.1% 24.0% 27.5%
Brazil 20.9% 22.9% 25.1% 26.3% 25.7% 26.4% 29.9%
Bulgaria 61.9% 55.7% 42.8% 23.7% 26.7%
Czech Rep. 61.1% 62.3% 68.7% 70.9% 65.6% 63.9%
Georgia 5.8% 6.6% 7.6%
Indonesia 38.3% 38.7% 40.4% 42.3% 46.1% 49.4% 53.4%
Korea 35.7% 37.3% 36.8% 36.6% 38.4% 42.1% 50.7%
Kyrgyz Rep. 12.8% 11.9% 13.8%
Malaysia 67.3% 73.7% 78.6% 77.8% 83.1% 88.5% 93.2%
Mexico 22.7% 24.6% 25.7% 25.1% 23.7% 25.1% 24.6%
Moldova 10.4% 11.4% 14.5% 17.6% 18.9%
Russia 14.6% 16.4% 17.8%
Thailand 69.5% 71.8% 71.0% 72.2% 75.4% 85.9% 99.0%
Ukraine 13.1% 12.1% 9.6% 9.4% 11.8% 13.1%
Source: Own calculations based of IFS data.17
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First, it should be noted that Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Ukraine have been
monetized on such a small scale that it is doubtful that monetary measures can capture
the symptoms of a currency crisis there. Very low monetization also characterises Russia
and Moldova. They rather indicate overall low confidence in the banking system and
government  policies.  And  indeed,  we  can  see  from  Table  3  that  broad  money
monetization did not fell, and even increased for Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Ukraine,
and Russia in 1998.
There was a visible fall in demand for money in Mexico in 1994, in Argentina in 1995,
and in the Czech Republic in 1997. The indicators show that monetization was depressed
during the two years following crises in Mexico and in the Czech Republic.
However, there were no signs of a decrease in the demand for money in any of the
East Asian economies. This result may either indicate that the nature of the East Asian
crisis was different or that the broad money aggregate is not a good measure for changes
in the money demand [3].
6. Real interest Rate Differentials
A central bank may also try to defend a currency when it comes to a pressure by
raising  interest  rates.  Table  4  shows  the  real  interest  rate  differentials  in  our  crisis
countries versus the US deposit rate. High real interest rates were in place in every
country, for which calculations were available, when the crisis hit. However, their relative
magnitudes varied. 
The highest interest rates have been present in Brazil around the 1999 crisis, which
followed a relatively free exchange rate regime at this time. Significant increases at the
time of the crisis were in place in Argentina, Russia, Thailand, and Ukraine.
7. Conclusions
The gradual shrinkage of reserves, taking place in the months preceding currency
crisis, is probably best captured by an indicator relating its level to the short-term debt.
[3] This may be also due to the inclusion of foreign currency deposits in the measure of M2. See the
discussion in the Appendix on this issue. However, data on this type of deposits are not available for Malaysia
and Indonesia.18
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Although  its  magnitude  is  related  to  the  exchange  rate  arrangement  of  a  given
economy, there has been observed a downward movement of this measure at a crisis
date in every analyzed country. Also, the indicator of reserves expressed in terms of
reserve  money  describes  well  the  episodes  of  currency  crises  in  this  sample  of
countries.  However,  its  use  is  limited  only  to  the  cases  of  fixed  exchange  rate
arrangements.
What  also  seems  to  properly  characterize  the  pre-crisis  situation  is  the  real
appreciation  of  domestic  currencies.  Real  effective  exchange  rates  of  the  analyzed
economies have been appreciating through several months prior to a crisis. Then, the
crisis was marked by their sharp decline. 
The currency crises in our sample rather did not manifest themselves by the fall in the
demand  for  money.  This  measure  is  probably  of  little  use  in  the  case  of  very  low
monetization countries. What more, any decrease in the broad money monetization has
not been observed during East Asian crisis. 
High domestic interest rates have been present in every of the analyzed countries at
times when their currencies came under a pressure. There were also significant increases
when a crisis hit, or shortly before, in nearly every of them, indicating the attempts of the
central banks to defend the currency. 
Table 4. Real Interest Rate Differentials around Crisis Dates, Monthly
Argentina Brazil Mexico Moldova Russia Thailand Ukraine
m-6 2.57 11.32 6.90 14.90 -1.30 2.99 6.32
m-5 1.94 11.51 7.93 17.89 -1.58 3.06 6.76
m-4 1.99 23.61 5.84 17.20 -1.11 2.45 7.76
m-3 2.08 30.63 4.85 17.25 1.51 2.05 10.21
m-2 2.17 24.87 3.95 17.98 3.68 1.47 11.93
m-1 3.30 23.03 4.16 15.97 5.66 1.50 11.98
crisis 11.65 29.84 4.53 23.22 3.96 3.21 12.90
m+1 11.36 37.97 11.59 26.49 -32.33 1.47 9.12
m+2 8.40 35.60 12.08 26.73 -35.25 1.15 5.13
m+3 4.29 26.91 23.68 25.20 -48.19 0.72 -0.01
m+4 4.07 19.79 23.35 24.61 -62.23 -0.04 -0.69
m+5 3.31 15.77 8.45 21.18 -75.96 -0.22 -3.18
m+6 3.86 15.25 -1.44 24.53 -83.80 -1.03 1.89
Source: Calculations of author's, R. Antczak, W. Paczyñski, and A. Radziwi³³, on the basis of IFS data.
Note: The interest rates are the real deposit rates compared with the real US deposit rate.If we were to find the symptoms of a currency crisis that have been most universal
throughout the emerging economies, we would have thus pointed on loss of international
reserves or serious nominal depreciation, coupled with a period of high real interest
rates, and preceded by the appreciation of real effective exchange rate. This finding
confirms the adequacy of Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1994) definition of a currency
crisis in analyzing the developments in the "emerging" or "transitional" economies.
Finally, it should be noted that the episodes of currency crises have been sometimes
difficult to identify using the standard measures in the case of the Kyrgyz Republic, and to
some extent, also for Ukraine and Moldova. This may either indicate the different nature
of these crises or simply the data problems.
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The calculations presented in this paper are primarily drawn on the International
Financial Statistics of the Monetary Fund, unless otherwise stated in the text.
In addition to the IFS numbers, data on foreign currency deposits of the banking
systems come from:
– Banco de Mexico at http://www.banxico.org.mx
– Bank of Korea at http://www.bok.or.kr
– Bank of Thailand at http://www.bot.org.th
– Bulgarian National Bank at http://www.bnb.bg
– Georgian Economic Trends No. 4, 1999 at http://www.geplac.org
– Moldovan Economic Trends at  http://www.moldova.md/economy/Tacis/met.htm
– Alberto Ramos from the IMF
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Some authors suggest that the decrease in monetary aggregates has not to be always
observed. This is because the aggregates include hard currency denominated deposits
[Berg,  1999].  Since  some  of  the  measures  analyzed  in  this  paper  might  have  been
influenced by this fact, the time path of foreign currency deposits is shown and analyzed
here. This analysis is heavily constrained by the availability of data. The author could not
find numbers on foreign currency deposits for Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Kyrgyz
Republic.
In order to filter the impact of exchange rate changes, foreign currency deposits –
expressed in national currencies in the balance sheet of deposit money banks – have been
converted to US dollars using the end-period exchange rate. 
Table  5  presents  month-on-month  changes  in  the  relative  magnitudes  of  foreign
currency deposits. We can see that these deposits dropped in almost every country at the
crisis time. The only exception being the Czech Republic, where there has not been a
deviation from the trend in the value of foreign currency deposits. Also in Thailand,
despite  the  significant  fall  one  month  before  the  crisis,  the  general  trend  has  been
upward. But generally, the results support the opinion that when analyzing broad money
aggregates, foreign currency deposits should be subtracted.
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Table 5. Monthly Changes in Foreign Currency Deposits around the Crisis Dates
Argentina Bulgaria Czech Rep. Georgia Korea Mexico Moldova Russia Thailand Ukraine
crisis date 1995M3 1997M2 1997M5 1998M12 1997M12 1994M12 1998M11 1998M8 1997M7 1998M9
m-12 1.55% -13.14% 3.48% -1.62% -6.71% -1.10% -0.32% 0.47% -3.64% 1.07%
m-11 2.00% 0.65% 0.51% 8.65% 86.24% 5.67% -2.34% 5.23% -11.03% -7.47%
m-10 0.18% -2.59% -4.47% 2.44% 47.04% -7.21% -0.74% 6.21% -18.69% -1.42%
m-9 1.88% -15.90% 0.74% 1.24% -4.25% 7.15% 6.12% 1.39% 26.56% 1.43%
m-8 2.66% -6.01% 2.35% 5.20% -20.74% 38.56% 2.98% 2.57% -9.97% -0.05%
m-7 1.77% -0.51% 1.36% 6.59% -25.26% -2.39% 7.52% -15.70% 17.47% 9.59%
m-6 1.81% 3.82% -3.95% 3.42% -24.07% 3.63% 11.02% 5.87% 24.70% -4.10%
m-5 1.25% -8.57% 1.62% -1.63% 41.47% 4.57% 4.50% 3.15% -4.85% 3.73%
m-4 2.40% -5.74% 4.92% 2.04% 20.55% 14.65% -4.19% -0.25% -7.55% 7.75%
m-3 3.08% -6.10% -2.71% -7.91% 13.33% 1.96% 6.20% 2.94% 73.27% -6.99%
m-2 2.49% -2.11% 37.99% -4.37% 22.92% -5.09% 7.20% -1.95% -4.54% 8.02%
m-1 -2.42% -2.18% 3.07% -13.93% 12.48% 6.25% 1.49% 1.97% -10.48% 4.59%
Crisis -10.62% -3.49% -7.92% 0.25% -31.42% 19.86% -15.42% -7.24% 18.25% -11.08%
m+1 -5.46% 3.64% 7.41% 4.63% 33.03% -25.79% -3.96% -14.08% 15.36% -3.46%
m+2 0.81% 1.19% 1.37% 6.86% 18.55% -20.40% -3.28% -9.46% 34.91% 0.02%
m+3 3.64% 3.56% 3.80% 1.33% 18.03% -10.37% 0.66% -2.16% -9.82% 1.74%
m+4 2.02% 2.15% -3.62% 3.36% 17.85% -3.03% 2.74% 2.61% -10.95% -0.62%
m+5 2.80% 1.56% 7.00% 4.14% 25.65% 3.56% 0.43% -2.21% -1.68% -0.68%
m+6 2.43% 3.44% -4.45% 9.67% -5.78% -0.03% 1.43% -0.28% 6.38% -0.22%
m+7 3.73% 1.53% 0.77% -0.73% 25.39% 3.86% 32.46% -1.36% -2.90% 2.32%
m+8 2.62% 4.52% 0.69% 4.02% -0.14% -10.20% -5.81% 4.06% 4.33% 2.65%
m+9 -1.65% -0.93% 1.00% 1.50% 3.92% 4.08% -0.37% -0.91% -5.52% 5.31%
m+10 4.48% -10.24% 4.80% -4.38% 2.32% 8.62% 6.93% 5.26% -6.57% -1.67%
m+11 1.87% 7.49% 2.70% 1.93% 1.04% -11.47% 2.90% -4.19% 13.61% 3.13%
m+12 2.29% -1.35% 10.71% 0.69% -25.17% 13.95% -1.09% 4.20% 30.74% 1.07%
Source: Own calculations on the basis of IMF and central banks data (see Data Sources section).